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‘Terribly unjust, subject to crisis, environmentally unwise, everywhere politically and 
economically captured by the few, and yet somehow impossible for anyone to alter or escape’: 
this is the world David Kennedy presents us with in his new book, A World of Struggle. To 
understand its stability, Kennedy argues, we must turn away from traditional accounts that focus 
on the interstate system or the global economy, and look behind these apparent structures to the 
work of experts. Global political and economic life is increasingly formed not in the visible 
centres of political decision-making, but in the shadowy world of technical management. This is 
not a world of calm analysis and sage counsel, but of ruthless internal struggle and unceasing 
conflict. It is also one that remains largely invisible, impervious to contestation. A World of 
Struggle seeks to pull back the veil on the workings of expertise, offering a rich description of 
the expert knowledge practices that shape our world.  
Kennedy, Professor of Law at Harvard, is best known as a leading heterodox thinker in the field 
of international law. His earliest interventions were significant in introducing the insights and 
sensibility of the US Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement into international legal scholarship. 
‘Theses about International Law Discourse’ (1980) and International Legal Structures (1987) 
drew on the structural linguistics of Saussure to argue that the surface chaos of international legal 
discourse hides a deep legal grammar. Despite the apparent randomness of ‘ever more 
complicated and diffuse arguments’ within increasingly fragmented legal fields, international 
law and legal argument are, in fact, structured around a central axial opposition: between 
sovereign interest and international norm—national particularism set against participation in an 
international community. This tension is apparent at the most fundamental level—that of 
sources: from where does international law come, and from where does it derive its normative 
authority? Sovereign states are bound by international rules only because sovereigns consent to 
be bound—a claim rooted in the supremacy of national interest. But if law is indistinguishable 
from the political interests of sovereign states, how can we explain the persistent view, shared by 
state policy makers, that exogenous norms rooted in social consensus must be considered? 
International law is constraining precisely when states do not wish to be constrained. And yet 
from where does this normative constraint arise if not from sovereign interest? This dialectical 
pattern of conflicting modes of justification or rhetorical styles may manifest differently across 
diverse doctrinal areas—the law of the sea, war or human rights, for example—but ultimately 
reflects a common opposition between cooperation and autonomy: a salmagundi of international 
legal doctrine structured, in fact, by the same fundamental arguments. In these recurring patterns, 
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Kennedy identified an international legal grammar—the langue, to use Saussure’s term—that 
nonetheless coexisted with substantively open and indeterminate arguments at the surface level 
of doctrine—the lawyers’ vernacular, or parole. The contradiction between sovereignty and 
community, Kennedy insisted, was ultimately irresolvable. Nothing internal to international law 
could determine which set of arguments, emphasizing one or the other pole, will be decisive. 
International law, in the final analysis, was ‘a conversation without content’.  
The originality of Kennedy’s argument can hardly be overstated. Few scholars before him had 
sought to extend the insights of CLS to international law. Kennedy, in these and subsequent 
works, expanded the horizon of inquiry for a new generation of scholars reassessing the 
foundational assumptions of the discipline. These ‘New Approaches to International Law’ 
(NAIL) shared all of CLS’s theoretical eclecticism: a potpourri of methodological commitments 
united by little more than a heterodox attitude towards international law and a nominal 
attachment to progressive politics. What coherence they had owed much to Kennedy personally 
and to his institution building. While Kennedy himself proclaimed NAIL ‘done’ in 1998, his 
intellectual production has remained iconoclastic. In The Dark Sides of Virtue (2004), he sought 
to undermine the certainties of humanitarian and human rights lawyers. Might the human rights 
movement be part of the very problem it set out to address, he asked, cataloguing the ‘possible 
risks, costs and unanticipated consequences’ of humanitarian thinking and practice? Efforts to 
bolster refugee protection, foster economic development, and regulate the conduct of war: each 
betrayed a noble humanitarian impulse gone awry, unquestioned assumptions blinding policy 
makers to the consequences of their efforts. In Of War and Law (2006), against the backdrop of 
Kosovo, 9/11 and the second Iraq war, Kennedy noted that humanitarians and military officials 
increasingly shared a vocabulary. Though they might appear to disagree prima facie, both were 
in fact central actors in the formation of an expert consensus that, in turn, shaped the politics of 
war: ‘If ours has become a culture of violence, it is a shared culture, the product of military and 
humanitarian hands.’  
Kennedy has produced a rich and varied body of work. But while his subject matter has shifted, a 
consistent theme runs throughout: international law is imagined not in conventional terms as a 
static set of rules, but as an argumentative practice. ‘The point about a norm is not its pedigree’, 
he wrote in Of War and Law, ‘but its persuasiveness’. To debate the validity of law is to beg the 
question; what really matters is ‘whose interpretation of the law will, in fact, prevail, and before 
what audience’. The community of professionals we know as international lawyers do not simply 
offer sage counsel on what the law permits or requires. Their conflicting articulations of the law 
are themselves productive of the law and legal relations as they come to shape our lived reality. 
In this sense, law is far from unique—it is simply one example of what Kennedy in his latest 
book calls the practice of expertise. Experts like to deny their agency. They appear to play a 
background role, using their specialized professional knowledge to advise, interpret and 
inform—what the public good demands; what the practical necessities of reason require; what 
scientific facts establish—while the real decisions are taken elsewhere, in the loci of power: the 
White House, the boardroom, the battlefront. Such a view of the world, and of experts’ place in 
it, is mistaken, or so Kennedy argues in A World of Struggle. Experts do not simply speak reason 
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to power: reason is a product of expertise; experts advance and legitimate political interests in 
universal terms, shaping and constraining the decisional space long before political decision-
makers enter the scene. Kennedy’s objective is thus ‘to bring knowledge practices and power 
practices into the same frame’, with expertise as ‘the crossroads where they intersect’.  
A World of Struggle sets out to construct a general model of the workings of experts and expert 
knowledge. At its heart, however, lie the building blocks of a more capacious social theory, one 
premised on a curious mix of methodological individualism and radical social constructivism. 
Citing Hobbes, Clausewitz and Schmitt, Kennedy places struggle at the centre of his model. The 
struggle between individuals is his epistemological lodestar, on which all further derivations rest. 
Yet his terrain of struggle is less a Hobbesian war of survival than an abstract topography on 
which people pursue self-interested ‘projects’. It is the pursuit of these projects, rather than the 
desire for self-preservation, which brings them into conflict. A project, Kennedy explains, is 
simply ‘something a person wants to achieve or obtain’. There is no a priori hierarchy of 
projects. One may want to victimize or to be a victim; while many desire prestige, others seek 
marginality, preferring to ‘denounce power than exercise it’. The pursuit of idiosyncratic and 
incompatible projects places individuals in conflict with one another. Each struggle has 
distributional consequences: allocating ‘resources, powers, statuses, or virtues’. These are not 
struggles among equals. Rather, there is ‘a pre-existing status of forces’: an uneven distribution 
of capabilities and competences among individuals engaging in struggle. In Kennedy’s extended 
metaphor: ‘It is helpful to think of people coming to struggle with little backpacks of legal and 
other entitlements, powers, and vulnerabilities’. What determines the makeup of my backpack? 
Its contents are also the product of struggle: to capture and lock in gains, excluding adversaries 
from what they value, but also improving one’s starting position ‘in the next round’. In this 
game-theory version of social relations, the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history 
of recurring rounds of struggle between rucksack-toting egoists.  
What, then, of group identities or solidarities? Nation, corporation, government, religion: these 
are plastic institutional forms, their existence contingent on the tactical solidarities of self-
interested individuals pursuing their projects. ‘When we say that corporations and nations and 
religions do things’, Kennedy writes, ‘we mean that people are speaking, exercising authority, 
making claims, cooperating or fighting with one another in their name.’ If struggle carries with it 
concrete distributional consequences, Kennedy nonetheless insists that the terrain on which it 
takes place is that of language and ideas: ‘the exercise of power, even as brute force, occurs 
within a discursive world of meaning.’ In pursuit of our projects, we exercise knowledge as 
power. Foucault, not Hobbes, is the guiding hand here. Power, Kennedy insists, ‘is everywhere 
legitimated by knowledge practices that rationalize, explain, interpret and associate exercises of 
power, powerful people and powerful institutions with myths, ideologies, and other large ideas 
about values and interests’. From our backpacks we draw on ‘tools of engagement’: vocabularies 
that offer ‘arguments and images for interpreting and contesting who and where one is, who can 
do what, who has what authority over whom, who can call upon the cavalry to what end’. We 
argue, posture and denounce, seeking to convince others that our parochial objectives are, in fact, 
matters of universal agreement, that our policy proposals are the most rational, effective or 
Tor Krever, Spectral Expertise 
 4 
desirable. Struggle, in short, ‘is undertaken with words’. Those words, to be sure, may carry an 
implicit threat: legal language is a particularly common mode of articulation precisely because 
law is ‘a site where words can be made real as coercion’. That tacit threat, however, is merely the 
distributional outcome of past discursive conflict.  
The exercise of expertise produces those domains about which experts claim to have knowledge. 
The World Bank economist claims an expert knowledge of the world economy, the international 
relations scholar an expert knowledge of the international state system. Yet these systems, in 
Kennedy’s analysis, are generated by discursive knowledge practices. This is, fundamentally, 
what sets Kennedy’s approach apart from traditional accounts that see experts working within a 
system—the global economy, say, or the interstate political system—‘counselling actors, 
interpreting their powers and the limitations of the structure, resolving disputes’. Kennedy, on 
the contrary, argues that expertise brings the ‘actors’ and ‘structures’ that populate those 
conventional accounts into being: structures such as ‘global capitalism’ or ‘the state system’, and 
entities such as states, corporations, capital and labour—these are rhetorical techniques; ‘labels 
attached to people for a purpose’. If we understand global affairs to involve nations interacting 
within an international system, or economic agents operating within a global market, this is a 
product of the ‘knowledge work’ of experts. Although socially constructed, these concepts settle 
over time into common sense—the hypostasized outcomes of earlier epistemic struggle forming 
the common terrain of contemporary battle.  
Kennedy’s is a universal theory of epistemic struggle: a general framework underpinning all 
social relations. Professionals are especially well placed to weaponize their expertise: leveraging 
the powers accrued in their backpacks—the ‘reservoirs of legitimacy’ attaching to professional 
standing—in pursuit of their projects. Yet, crucially for Kennedy’s argument, expertise is not the 
exclusive province of professionals. We ought not to speak of experts or expertise, he suggests, 
but of an ‘expertise effect’: the ability to convince others to yield to one’s status as an expert. 
Here, expertise is ‘less a form of knowledge deployed by specialized actors than a form of 
knowledge work undertaken by all kinds of people in their relationship with others’.  
Expertise is also the terrain on which global governance takes place. The latter rests on the 
construction of select problems as global in nature. For problems to transcend the local and 
become global issues of concern, we must first conceive of a single unified world. If everyone 
conceives of the world as a series of bounded, parochial communities, few are likely to conclude 
its problems require global solutions. The construction of a global world has been centuries in 
the making. In the early 16th century, the Spanish theologian and jurist Francisco Vitoria wrote 
of a universal humanity that encompassed not only Europeans but also the indigenous peoples of 
the Americas. They too were human, subjects of a universal natural law. As it turned out, 
membership of a universal community included both rights and duties, including an obligation of 
hospitality—to European commerce and proselytization. In our own age, the Blue Marble image 
captured by Apollo 17 in 1972 did much to produce a conception of a unified globe. This 
translunar photograph, one of the most reproduced images in history, made visible, or so 
Kennedy contends—world wars and an international communist movement, among other world-
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historical phenomena, go unmentioned—a ‘deep truth’: that ‘ours is one world, we are one 
humanity, Planet Earth is our only home’. Environmental catastrophe, economic crisis, 
humanitarian disasters: each could be framed as an urgent problem demanding global solutions 
only once we saw the world whole. The consolidation of this donnée carried with it distributive 
implications. As the notion of ‘one world’ became a banality, those pursuing more parochial 
projects were disadvantaged relative to the globalization boosters, environmentalists, and liberal 
humanitarians ‘whose projects could be hooked to the coat-tails of the one world idea’. Those 
humanitarians, for instance, describe a world of consensus, of shared humanity and common 
values, whose united peoples must be protected against malevolent outsiders. Their outlook has 
its attendant vocabulary—the ‘conscience of mankind’, ‘fundamental norms’, ‘responsibility to 
protect’—and institutional forms—an ‘international community’ denouncing outsiders, imposing 
sanctions and bombing to ‘protect civilians’. When NATO sought to depose Muammar Gaddafi, 
the situation in Libya was thus framed as a global crisis, a challenge to the ethics of an 
‘international community’ by an ‘outlier rascal’. Military intervention was ‘at once confirmation 
and consequence of that frame’.  
The denouement of prior struggle among experts, settled understandings of the world set the 
stage for today’s decisions. It is here, in the space between background and foreground, that 
experts rule. They create the framework for decisions by setting out—but also narrowing, 
delimiting and obscuring—the choices available to political leaders, sovereigns and business 
elites: explaining ‘what history and precedent require’ and standing between ‘the objective 
observation of facts’ and ‘the subjective exercise of discretion’. Those leaders appear to make 
decisions—their choices certainly shape the distribution of power and wealth in the world—on 
the basis of their interests or ideological preferences, and yet, if discretion and responsibility are 
the defining attributes of the foreground, these actors in fact find their agency replaced with ‘the 
felt necessity of deference to contextual forces and facts’. People speak of the ‘forces of 
globalization’, the ‘needs of the market’ or ‘global warming’, Kennedy observes, ‘as if they were 
facts demanding responses rather than interpretations rooted in human decision’.  
The work of experts, however, is a ‘plural and contested activity’. Law, economics, political 
science—each professional discipline and sub-discipline has its own vocabulary for 
understanding and managing the world. Development economics, for example, is nowadays 
marked by a plurality of theories: expert consensus about what development is and how to bring 
it about no sooner arises than it quickly disintegrates—prescriptions run the gamut from 
Washington Consensus policies to import-substitution industrialization. The world of human 
rights activists, in contrast, bears the stamp of consensus: ‘They articulate what needs no 
articulation. They may be ignored, but rejoinder is less common.’ States may practice torture, but 
few will assert its normative validity. ‘Different modes of expertise’, Kennedy observes, ‘jostle 
with one another to de ne and manage aspects of global life’. And yet, ‘for all these differences 
in the role, style, and content of expert knowledge’, Kennedy finds common patterns in the 
‘iterative and interactive process of doing things with words’. The structuralist tendency of 
International Legal Structures clearly still animates Kennedy in his effort to identify a grammar 
of expertise—hence, perhaps, his insistence that expertise is not merely ‘analogous to language’ 
Tor Krever, Spectral Expertise 
 6 
but is primarily a discursive practice; his study is thus styled as a semiotics of expert argument.  
Experts are subject to an incentive to develop new theories, policies and arguments. As such, the 
‘armature of argument’ in any given field is continuously expanding: theoretical insights, drawn 
from diverse disciplines, proliferate; while the apparatus of expertise grows ever more 
sophisticated. This drive toward greater analytical sophistication and theoretical proliferation is 
accompanied, in Kennedy’s account, by a sense of professional ‘disenchantment’. Paradoxically, 
however, experts appear not just untroubled but emboldened by the ‘uncertainty of their 
expertise’. Economists may no longer believe in theories of absolute laissez faire or the planned 
economy, but it is not uncommon, Kennedy writes, to find those economists deploying such 
arguments and frameworks long after they have been ‘disabused of their analytic rigour and 
persuasiveness’. International law provides the clearest example of an expert practice at once 
‘sophisticated and disenchanted’. The rise of managerial technocracy in global affairs has been 
accompanied by the expansion of the dominion of the legal. Indeed, the emergence of a regime 
of global governance is, in part, the story of that expansion and the proliferation of legal 
language as governance vulgate. Kennedy is at his best when describing the contemporary 
ubiquity of international law. ‘Although it is easy to think of international affairs as a rolling sea 
of politics over which we have managed to throw but a thin net of legal rules’, he observes, ‘in 
truth the situation today is more the reverse. There is law at every turn.’ Military conflict, 
Kennedy reminds us, is today a thoroughly legal animal, with ‘targets pored over by lawyers and 
belligerents on all sides legitimating their cause and denouncing their adversaries in legal terms’. 
So too is global economic life: capital, labour, credit, money, liquidity—each is a creature of 
law. Legal arrangements everywhere shape the bargaining power of different groups and social 
interests. It is no surprise, then, that law has become the expert vocabulary of argument par 
excellence: a ‘transnational language of entitlement and disputation’. At the same time, the 
ubiquity of legal language has generated an ever-expanding range of modes of legal reasoning, 
leaving lawyers ‘ever less con dent in their decisiveness or clarity’. Professional jurists once 
adhered to discrete theories of their field: ‘naturalism’ or ‘positivism’ could explain why 
international law was binding in a world of sovereign states. These days, no one is a positivist or 
a naturalist. ‘An international law professional today’, Kennedy holds, ‘ought to be an eclectic 
and savvy strategist, drawing on all these theories and their progeny’.  
The law of war evinces the same pattern as other expert sub-fields: where once there appeared to 
be clear rules and distinctions, we now find ‘a confusing mix of principles and counterprinciples, 
of firm rules and loose exceptions’. The international laws of war do not necessarily act to limit 
the violence of the battlefield. International legal discourse certainly provides a powerful 
vocabulary for articulating humanitarian ethics. It also remains the primary rhetoric through 
which the legitimacy of war is assessed: was the use of force necessary for a given military 
objective? Was the collateral loss of civilian life proportionate to that objective? Crucially, 
however, this language—of legitimate targeting, proportionate violence, and so on—is equally 
efficacious when deployed by military experts. Lawyers participate in modern warfare: they 
accompany troops on frontline deployment and are ubiquitous in Pentagon planning rooms, 
scrutinizing all operational manoeuvres and targets. For every claim of an unjustified loss of 
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civilian life, military lawyers advance a claim of proportionality. Killing civilians, after all, is 
perfectly legal if proportionate, and, when it comes to proportionality, there are only shades of 
grey. Lawfare—the use of the law as a weapon to strategic ends—has long been deplored by the 
US right, who complain of adversaries using legal principles to ‘handcuff’ the US military; of 
those who would ‘exploit our values to defeat us’. For Kennedy, however, this is the 
quintessence of legal expertise: the military, after all, are no different when it comes to lawfare—
they too mobilize international law to their own ends. All targeting decisions, Washington, Tel 
Aviv and Moscow alike proclaim, are in compliance with legal norms.  
What are we to make of A World of Struggle? It is impressive in scope, drawing together the 
various concerns and insights of Kennedy’s long career, and expanding his analysis beyond the 
provincialism of international law scholarship. His style is limpid, if austere, and refreshingly 
free of the ostentatious jargon that so often characterises writing on such subjects. His examples 
are drawn from a range of disciplines and fields, although with a heavy bias towards 
development economics and international law, which unsurprisingly provides the richest 
descriptions. However, in drawing primarily on his own professional domain, Kennedy risks 
overstating the continuities between a specifically legal expertise and expertise as such. The 
distinctive qualities of international legal argument and assertion, traced so memorably in 
International Legal Structures, risk disappearing in the solvent of abstracted expertise.  
Other questions might be asked. How convincing, for example, is Kennedy’s description of 
experts’ attitudes towards their own fields? Harvard lawyers, certainly, are taught that legal 
practice consists in navigating an infinite terrain of argumentation; that innovative, even cynical, 
manipulation of legal doctrine is synonymous with legal skill. To what extent, however, is this 
true across legal education, especially outside North America? A startling number of liberal 
international lawyers retain a naïve and utterly unjaded faith in their sacred cows. Many outside 
the US will fail to recognize themselves in Kennedy’s portrait. And what of other fields? Are 
mainstream economists really so cynical about their descriptions of the world? If only that were 
so. Certainly the further one moves from the academy, the more committed and less 
disenchanted expert practitioners appear. The key question, perhaps, is this: to what extent might 
an elite and professional parochialism have distorted Kennedy’s generalizations?  
Kennedy is far from being the first scholar of expertise, yet he largely neglects the extant 
literature on the topic. Indeed, other than a discussion of Ricardo and Myrdal’s economic 
thinking, and the aforementioned invocation of a banalized Hobbes, Clausewitz and Schmidt, 
there is little sustained engagement with any thinkers of note. In the absence of any bibliography, 
a handful of endnotes provide the only hints as to the theoretical influences that have shaped 
Kennedy’s study. Many of these are oddities: Immanuel Wallerstein is cited as significant, yet 
the sum total of his influence appears to be a recognition of the relationship between a centre and 
a periphery—the notion of a world system, let alone a capitalist one, is immediately jettisoned by 
Kennedy, the ‘global situation’ imagined simply as a free-floating ‘kind of dualism’. The 
influence of Saussure—so apparent in International Legal Structures—clearly remains, but the 
most visible inspiration in A World of Struggle is the radical social constructivism of the late 
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20th century: in particular, the poststructuralist sociology of science and technology, with its 
focus on the ‘performative dimension of expert practice: expert work constituting the space of its 
own expertise’. Kennedy acknowledges his debt to this sociological work, citing Donald 
MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa and Lucia Siu’s collection, Do Economists Make Markets?: On the 
Performativity of Economics, and tracing their thought back through the Actor-Network Theory 
of Bruno Latour and Michel Callon. Kennedy is particularly taken with Callon and MacKenzie’s 
argument for the performativity of economics: their central proposition—that economists do not 
merely describe the economy but actively produce it—offers a prime example of expertise at the 
coalface. Citing Callon’s Laws of the Market, Kennedy writes that ‘economists do not merely 
study markets, they “make” them by articulating what markets are and how they function’. In 
what follows, however, any distinction between the making of markets and the production of 
meaning about markets—or between the discipline of economics and the material economy—is 
elided in Kennedy’s misprision of the sociology of finance. Indeed, Callon’s thought permeates 
the epistemology of A World of Struggle: his insistence that ‘capitalism is an invention of anti-
capitalists’ and rejection of macro-scales anticipate the leitmotifs of A World of Struggle, with its 
parallel scepticism of macro-level explanations. Ultra-nominalism and an elision of material 
concerns thus mark Kennedy’s choice of inheritance. If Kennedy recognizes the tension between 
the premises of his project—a rejection of the structural and systematic as legitimate objects of 
analysis—and its ambition—to describe a universal system of grammar that structures all 
arguments about knowledge claims—there is no hint of such an awareness here.  
Those premises also foreclose any trenchant historical engagement. Kennedy draws examples 
from a sweeping historical panorama—spanning the Spanish scholastics to the present day—but 
his theory remains fundamentally ahistorical. His denial of systemic forces and attendant 
insistence on the contingency of struggle makes historical explanation impossible, leaving only, 
in Nancy Fraser’s words, the ‘abstract transhistorical property of language’. How and why has 
technocratic governance assumed a guiding position in global governance, the reader wonders? 
Kennedy can offer no explanation for the historical emergence of this division of labour or its 
world-historical significance. In Kennedy’s own telling, expertise was not always the 
disenchanted domain of cynically strategic professionals. Why, then, is it so now? If Vitoria was 
already performing expert-style knowledge work in the 16th century, what accounts for the 
explosion of expertise as the dominant mode of governance in the proceeding centuries? Marx, 
of course, offered some insight into these questions, directing us to the precise structures that 
Kennedy would sooner dismiss—modes of production reproduced in social formations and to 
which ‘definite social forms of thought correspond’. It is not mere contingency that theologians 
were once the leading experts of their time or that their arguments no longer carry the weight 
they once did, nor that in our own time, in which material interests prevail, it is lawyers and 
economists who have supplanted them as exemplars of expertise. ‘The Middle Ages could not 
live on Catholicism, nor the ancient world on politics’, Marx observed. Nor the modern world on 
law, we might add. Almost a century ago, the Soviet legal scholar Evgeny Pashukanis 
demonstrated that capitalism cannot be easily dismissed if we wish to understand the historical 
specificity of legal relations. With only transhistorical abstractions in his backpack, Kennedy 
appears somewhat akin to Don Quixote in Marx’s bon mot, who ‘long ago paid the penalty for 
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wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society’. If 
experts work against a tableau of sedimented ideas, where did those sedimented ideas originate? 
How do sites of expert struggle become solidified as background common sense? Given 
Kennedy’s belief in contingency, he can offer very little insight into how and why our conceptual 
frameworks and attendant commonsense assumptions change over time. To conceive epistemic 
shifts as indeterminate, contingent happenings makes historical explanation of the dynamics of 
expertise—of the process of struggle and sedimentation—fundamentally impossible. All 
Kennedy can offer in response to such questions are fractal iterations of the same abstracted 
game: discursive struggle all the way down.  
However, despite lingering in the linguistic realm, Kennedy does not altogether deny the 
existence of an extra-discursive real world. In seeking to understand why some expert arguments 
become accepted as fact, ‘it is easy’, he writes, ‘to underestimate the role of coercion or social 
hegemony, to overestimate the role of persuasion, or to imagine persuasion as a matter of good 
arguments driving out bad. In every field, relations with the material world of force and the 
social world of prestige and legitimacy will be different’. He is clear-sighted about the real 
consequences of expert rule. Wealth, status, opportunity: these are the distributional stakes 
Kennedy is, from the very first page of his book, deeply concerned with. The work of 
distribution may be done at the level of discourse, but it nonetheless produces concrete outcomes 
and changes in material circumstances. Yet Kennedy is unwilling to consider that the reverse 
might be also true: that material forces in the real world might determine the relative power of 
various discourses. The relationship between the discursive world in which experts argue and the 
real world that those experts argue about and shape thus necessarily remains half-hidden from 
view.  
Such equivocation was already apparent in Kennedy’s first, seminal interventions, in which 
international law was depicted as a series of oscillating but ultimately indeterminate arguments. 
He was deeply influenced by the indeterminacy thesis advanced by an earlier generation of 
critical legal scholars, particularly Duncan Kennedy (no relation). Against a Marxist view of 
legal doctrine as the product and servant of ruling-class interests, the elder Kennedy argued that 
legal doctrine bears the stamp not of class bias, but of radical indeterminacy. In the modern era, 
the legal doctrine of freedom of contract, for example, serves the interests of capital, but not 
because the doctrine is inherently pro-capital. Rather, capitalist interests exploit what is at root an 
unfixed doctrine and one that could, through struggle, be reconfigured to advance opposing 
interests. Thus freedom of contract is open to appropriation by labour—that no such 
appropriation has thus far taken place is not the result of any logic inherent in the doctrine, but of 
an external system of power relations. Indeterminacy is not the same as randomness. Even if 
legal conclusions do not flow in a predictable way from legal doctrines, the power relations of a 
particular conjuncture still systematically shape the outcomes of legal disputes. While the 
younger Kennedy was quick to insist that structural indeterminacy did not render international 
law an ‘anarchistic anything-goes morass’, nor did he seek to elucidate in any detail the—often 
predicable—ways in which the indeterminacy of legal discourse was resolved. In International 
Legal Structures, Kennedy professed disinterest in ‘the relationship between international legal 
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materials and their political and interpretive milieu’—‘I am not concerned about the context 
within which arguments are made and doctrines developed.’ Context was irrelevant to the project 
of a structuralist reading of international law.  
In A World of Struggle, Kennedy is faced with the same dilemma, now extrapolated from 
international legal argument to expert argument in general. Here he concedes that ‘it remains 
difficult to explain why some arguments succeed or persuade while others fail when the 
vocabulary has become so plastic. It is hard not to conclude—or at least be suspicious— that 
“something else” is going on.’ Others working in the Marxist tradition, such as Robert Knox and 
China Miéville, have in fact provided trenchant accounts of that ‘something else’: of the 
structural biases that reproduce the dominance of some international legal interpretations and 
arguments over others, thus illuminating what Susan Marks memorably called the ‘false 
contingency’ of international law. Beyond the disciplinary confines of legal scholarship, an 
entire tradition of ideology critique, from Marx via Gramsci and the early Frankfurt School, has 
catalogued the relationship between the material and linguistic; between the systemic logic of 
capitalism and the ideological forms it throws up. Yet for Kennedy, still allergic to systemic 
logics, the ‘something else’ remains elusive, and is quickly ushered out of sight, lest it destabilize 
the discursive foundations of the analytical architecture of A World of Struggle.  
Kennedy’s book is valuable, nonetheless, in seeking to raise ‘a critical suspicion’ about experts 
and their practices. Expertise hides its own nature, naturalizing the established order and 
displacing responsibility. ‘To ask how hegemony arises’, he writes, is already to ‘participate in 
its erosion’. Yet, in Kennedy’s view, it is almost impossible for us to extricate ourselves from the 
hegemony of expertise. We no longer know how to challenge expert practices and the 
inequalities they perpetuate without resorting to the vernacular of expertise. ‘Insiders and 
outsiders’, he writes, ‘are speaking the same language’, playing ‘opposing roles’ in the theatre of 
world affairs, where ‘expertise is the coin of the realm’. There is no escape from that theatre of 
discursive struggle in which expertise holds epistemic primacy. Yet we are not without hope, 
Kennedy assures us. In the very operations of expert rule lie the possibilities of an alternative 
future. When two experts advance competing arguments, one must prevail and the other yield. In 
this moment of yielding, of abandoning one’s position for that of another, the expert is unmoored 
from the ‘technical argument, interest, or ideological commitment that seemed to compel and 
justify his position’. Suddenly he is faced with a choice: a ‘moment of vertigo and professional 
freedom’. ‘In that moment’, Kennedy suggests, hopefully if enigmatically, ‘we may glimpse an 
alternative to rule by experts: rule by people deciding responsibly in a moment of unknowing’.  
Must our political horizon be limited to momentary glimpses of another world within an existing 
world of vertiginous experts and responsible policymakers? Are all oppositional vocabularies 
and movements really just attempts at expert mimesis? Or might Kennedy’s claustrophic theatre 
of expertise reflect his own narrow engagement with a limited thought world? For all the 
author’s invocations of ‘political economy’, there is no engagement with the tradition by that 
name which developed as a radical alternative to the orthodoxies of neoclassical economics. 
Instead, the book reads at times like a vitae of encounters with a mainstream elite: ‘My first year 
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at Davos . . .’; ‘I had dinner a couple of years ago with a leading European politician . . .’; ‘a 
retired German ambassador invited me to his home in Berlin for dinner with an array of political 
luminaries . . .’; ‘I spent some time in the cabinet of a commissioner of the European Union . . .’; 
‘When I trained military commanders in Africa for the US Navy . . .’. Save for a visit to Occupy 
Wall Street, A World of Struggle betrays a haughty distance from any radical politics.  
Still, it might be instructive to take Kennedy at his word. No description, he rightly observes, is 
neutral; each carries with it a political valence. Kennedy is, of course, an expert himself, and 
while his own story about the world is offered as a neutral, detached portrait of expertise, it is at 
the same time an exercise in expertise—an argument with its own distributional stakes. Whose 
interests, we might ask, are served by a description of the world in which concentrations of 
power in the global economy are merely contingent, not the product of any systemic logic; where 
global capital is a fiction, resistance futile, even counterproductive, and oppositional politics and 
traditional organizational forms useless relics of the past? A World of Struggle is an important 
corrective to celebrations of technocratic management, laying bare the ways in which modern 
expertise encourages us to mistake the present for the possible. But might Kennedy’s apologia 
for capitalism not effect an ideological erasure as politically debilitating as any expert argument? 
